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Trade Secrets Go Federal – Parade to Follow 
INTRODUCTION 
Trade secrets, despite being vital to the growth and operation of the U.S. economy, 
are regularly and extensively—but typically with little public notice— subject to 
misappropriation.1 Could you imagine if thousands of banks were robbed daily? Yet, 
businesses of all types and sizes that rely on their trade secrets to maintain commercial 
competitiveness within their respective markets are frequently victimized.2 It is quite 
remarkable that trade secret misappropriation has pervaded the U.S. economy with 
neither federal relief nor a national enforcement policy considering that railroads and 
other less consequential elements of our economy have been federally regulated for 
more than a century.3 So perhaps there should have been a parade when on May 11, 
2016, a nearly unanimous Congress passed the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 
 
© 2017 Joseph Brees 
   J.D. Candidate, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law, 2018; B.A., Binghamton 
University, State University of New York, 2015. I would like to thank Professor Patricia Campbell and the entire 
staff of the Journal of Business & Technology Law for their insightful counsel on this Comment. Nevertheless, all 
opinions, errors, omissions, and conclusions in this Comment are my own. I would like to dedicate this Comment 
to my grandfather, Arnold Mazur, whose love, guidance, and support has made me the man I am today.   
 1.  Given that trade secrets are meant to be “secret,” no exact monetary value can be calculated with absolute 
certainty. See BRIAN T. YEH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43714, PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRETS: OVERVIEW OF THE 
CURRENT LAW AND LEGISLATION 13–14 (2016) [hereinafter CRS REPORT]. However, some have attempted to 
quantify it. See Elizabeth A. Rowe, Contributory Negligence, Technology, and Trade Secrets, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
1, 5 (2009); PWC & CREATE.ORG, ECONOMIC IMPACT OF TRADE SECRET THEFT: A FRAMEWORK FOR COMPANIES TO 
SAFEGUARD TRADE SECRETS AND MITIGATE POTENTIAL THREATS, 5 (2014), http://www.pwc.com/us/en/forensic-
services/publications/assets/economic-impact.pdf. 
 2.  Some notable businesses include (but are not limited to): Motorola, DuPont, Goodyear, Boeing, Dow 
Chemicals, and Goldman Sachs. Brooklyn Law Sch., Cases from Economic Espionage Act, TRADE SECRETS 
INSTITUTE http://tsi.brooklaw.edu/category/legal-basis-trade-secret-claims/economic-espionage-act (last visited 
Feb. 5, 2017).  
 3.  See City of Auburn v. United States, 154 F.3d 1025, 1029 (9th Cir. 1998) (“We begin by first noting that 
Congress and the courts long have recognized the need to regulate railroad operations at the federal level. 
Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate the railroads is well established.”) (internal citations 
omitted).  
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(DTSA) providing trade secrecy recourse beyond the mix of civil remedies available 
under State laws.4  
Congress passed DTSA in order to create a federal solution to the national 
problem of trade secret misappropriation in interstate commerce.5 DTSA, generally 
creates a private cause of action under the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 (“EEA”),6 
permits a federal court to conduct ex parte seizures respecting trade secrets, provides 
for remedies and damages, and protects whistleblowers by extending civil and 
criminal immunity.7 Mindful that trade secrets have been regulated by the States, 
Congress clearly intended that DTSA give plaintiffs another remedial opportunity by 
supplementing rather than preempting State laws on the subject.8  
Some scholars find federalizing trade secret protection, and therefore DTSA, to be 
a recipe for disaster.9 Among the numerous arguments made, one in particular stands 
out: DTSA will bring forth the “Trade Secret Troll” (“TST”).10 A TST is a 
commercially oriented entity formed to accumulate rights to trade secrets that an 
“unsuspecting” party may misappropriate in order to demand a licensing fee, 
royalties, or other forms of payment.11 If the unsuspecting party refuses to pay, the 
TST will initiate expensive litigation when it is warranted.12 The argument that DTSA 
will inspire TSTs to troll is premised on two foundational points: (1) trolls will bring 
trade secret misappropriation claims under a false belief that they own a trade secret, 
 
 4.  See generally Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376 (establishing a federal 
civil action for trade secret misappropriation).  
 5.  See Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 384.  
 6.  Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–32 (2012).  
 7.  Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376–85. DTSA also establishes: (1) U.S. 
district courts to have original jurisdiction for actions brought under DTSA, (2) new definitions for 
“misappropriation” and “improper means,” (3) rights of trade secret owners to keep their trade secret 
confidential, (4) a requirement for the Attorney General to create a public report biannually of the instances of 
trade secret misappropriation and what the federal government is doing to stop it, (5) Congress’ findings about 
trade secret misappropriation, and (6) requirements for the Federal Judicial Center to develop and recommend 
“best practices” to enforce certain provisions of DTSA to Congress. Id.  
 8.  H.R. REP. NO. 114-529, at 5 (2016); 162 CONG. REC. S16, 630 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 2016) (statement of Sen. 
Coon). 
 9.  David S. Levine & Sharon K. Sandeen, Here Come the Trade Secret Trolls, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 
230, 238 (2015) [hereinafter Troll]; Letter from David S. Levine, et al., Professor, Princeton Univ., to members of 
Congress (August 26, 2014) (on file with author); Letter from David S. Levine, et al., Professor, Princeton Univ., 
to Senator Charles Grassley, Senator Patrick Leahy, Representative Robert Goodlatte, and Representative John 
Conyers, Jr., (Nov. 17, 2015) (on file with author); Zoe Argento, Killing the Golden Goods: The Dangers of 
Strengthening Domestic Trade Secret Rights in Response to Cyber-Misappropriation, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 172, 176–
77 (2014); Christopher B. Seaman, The Case Against Federalizing Trade Secrecy, 101 VA. L. REV. 317, 321–22 
(2015).  
 10.  Troll, supra note 9, at 234.  
 11.  Id.  
 12.  Id.  
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and (2) DTSA’s ex parte seizure will become the troll’s greatest coercion weapon.13 
They conclude that, TSTs, like the Patent Troll,14 will not remain under the “bridge”15 
and will cause havoc for businesses and entrepreneurs alike.16 
This Comment argues that while TSTs may pursue frivolous or specious claims, 
DTSA makes it no easier for them to prevail than State laws had previously.17 
Preliminarily, to misappropriate a trade secret under both DTSA and all State laws, 
there must be an intent to misappropriate by improper means; this is not the case 
under the strict liability standard18 for patent infringement to which trade secret 
misappropriation has been compared.19 Without the requisite intent and the 
improper means, both of which are apparently absent from most of the TST’s 
intended targets, the TST has no one to troll.20 As for the concern that the TST will 
bring an action under DTSA even if there is no trade secret, it does not follow that 
DTSA would increase trolling behavior.21 Put differently, prospective plaintiffs in 
trade secret misappropriation cases should first decide whether the information in 
question constitutes a trade secret before pursuing litigation. TSTs are therefore 
logically discouraged from organizing and aggressively litigating cases under DTSA, 
rendering claims of their potential danger too speculative to be accepted.22  
This Comment also argues that TSTs will not be able to easily wield their supposed 
greatest coercion weapon, the ex parte seizure, because of DTSA’s stringent 
requirements and the possibility of defending against a wrongful seizure action.23 
Ultimately, if a TST improperly sues an unsuspecting entity, it is likely that the 
litigation will include an affirmative claim of bad faith against the TST that could 
result in substantial attorney’s fees and deter future trolling behavior.24   
Part I of this Comment provides a brief overview of how trade secrets have 
impacted the U.S. economy and what DTSA does to remedy trade secret 
 
 13.  Troll, supra note 9, at 241, 252.  
 14.  See infra note 61.  
 15.  See Katharine Pyle, The Three Billy Goats Gruff: Three Billy Goats Gruff Try to Cross a Bridge – and Outwit 
a Troll Who Wants to Eat Them!, STORYBERRIES: FREE STORIES FOR KIDS, http://storyberries.com/the-three-billy-
goats-gruff/. 
 16.  See Troll, supra note 9, at 263. 
 17.  See infra Part III and Part IV.  
 18.  Strict liability is a legal doctrine that makes a person or a company responsible for their actions or 
products which cause damages regardless of any intent or negligence on their part. See generally Kenneth S. 
Abraham, Strict Liability in Negligence, DEPAUL L. REV. 271 (2012) (illustrating a thorough analysis of strict 
liability and its role in Tort law).  
 19.  See infra Part III(A). 
 20.  See infra Part III.  
 21.  See infra Part III(B). 
 22.  See id.  
 23.  See infra Part III(C). 
 24.  See infra Part IV. 
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misappropriation. Part II focuses on what constitutes a “troll” in patent law and how 
some scholars have argued that similar trolling will occur because of DTSA.  Part III 
will discuss how TSTs will fail in their attempt to use DTSA to their advantage, and 
that DTSA renders the TST weak and ineffective. Part IV discusses a DTSA remedy 
which an unsuspecting entity has to combat the TST in court.  
I.  DEFEND TRADE SECRETS ACT OF 2016: A NATIONAL SOLUTION TO A 
NATIONAL PROBLEM  
A.  Trade Secrets and Their Impact 
A trade secret is confidential and commercially valuable information that provides a 
business with a competitive advantage in the marketplace.25 Interest in protecting 
these secrets has existed since antiquity.26 This interest has not abated.27 In fact, 
multiple U.S. International Trade Commission surveys indicate that internationally-
engaged businesses have classified trade secrets as “very important” to the vitality of 
their business.28 This importance likely stems from trade secrets making up a majority 
of those businesses’ intellectual property portfolios.29 For “knowledge-intensive” 
industries,30 trade secrets compose an even higher percentage of the intellectual 
property portfolio.31 U.S. publicly traded companies own five trillion dollars in trade 
secret information.32 In addition, trade secret misappropriation is rampant and 
harming American businesses.33 Although the net effect of trade secret theft is difficult 
to quantify, analysts believe that such theft costs the  United States up to three percent 
 
 25.  CRS REPORT, supra note 1, at 2.  
 26.  See generally A. Arthur Schiller, Trade Secrets and the Roman Law: The Actio Servi Corrupti, 30 COLUM. 
L. REV. 837 (1930) for a fascinating read on how Roman law punished a party who attempted to induce a slave 
owner’s slave into disclosing their owner’s business secrets.   
 27.  KATHERINE LINTON, THE UNEXPECTED IMPORTANCE OF TRADE SECRETS: NEW DIRECTIONS IN 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICY MAKING AND EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 1–2 (2016), http://www.eastwestcenter.org/ 
sites/default/files/filemanager/pubs/pdfs/2-3Linton-201606.pdf 
 28.  U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, TRADE, INVESTMENT, AND INDUSTRIAL POLICIES IN INDIA; EFFECTS ON THE U.S. 
ECONOMY, Investigation Number: 332-543, Publication Number 4501, at 144 (Dec. 2014); see U.S. INT’L TRADE 
COMM’N, CHINA: EFFECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INFRINGEMENT AND INDIGENOUS INNOVATION POLICIES ON 
THE U.S. ECONOMY, Investigation Number: 332-519, Publication Number 4226, at 3-21 (May 2011) (“Firms that 
reported IPR [intellectual property right] infringement in China said their top IP-related concerns during 2007-
2009 were stolen trade secrets . . .”). 
 29.  U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, THE CASE FOR ENHANCED PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRETS IN THE TRANS-
PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT 10 (2014), https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/legacy/ 
international/files/Final%20TPP%20Trade%20Secrets%208_0.pdf.  
 30.  These industries include manufacturing, information services, and scientific services. Id.  
 31.  Id.  
 32.  Rowe, supra note 1, at 5.  
 33.  EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, ADMINISTRATION STRATEGY ON 
MITIGATING THE THEFT OF U.S. TRADE SECRETS, 1 (2013).  
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in Gross Domestic Product.34  Misappropriation of trade secrets is a national problem 
that requires a national solution.35 On May 11, 2016, the national solution was signed 
into law: the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016.36 
B.  What does the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 do? 
DTSA creates a federal civil remedy for trade secret misappropriation when the trade 
secret is “related to a product or service used in, or intended for use in, interstate or 
foreign commerce.”37 DTSA also provides remedies to victims of trade secret 
misappropriation.38 In an attempt to harmonize federal and State trade secrets law, 
DTSA incorporates the Uniform Trade Secrets Act’s39(“UTSA”) definitions of 
“misappropriation” and “improper means.”40 To further educate the public and 
Congress about trade secrets, DTSA mandates that the Attorney General publish a 
biannual report on trade secret misappropriation and how to combat it.41 DTSA 
summarizes legislative intent and provides civil and criminal immunity to any person 
who discloses a trade secret to an agent of the government42 to report a suspected 
violation of the law.43 Finally, DTSA requires employers to notify their employees 
about DTSA’s immunity clause or else forfeit the ability to recover exemplary 
damages or attorney’s fees in any action under DTSA.44 
 
 34.  PWC & CREATE.ORG, supra note 1, at 3.  
 35.  See 162 CONG. REC. H2, 32 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 2016) (statement of Rep. Conyers) (“S. 1890 would provide 
trade secret owners access to uniform national law and the ability to make their case in Federal court.”); 162 
CONG. REC. H2, 33 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 2016) (statement of Rep. Collins) (“Protecting the trade secrets of American 
businesses is crucial to keeping our country a leader in the world economy.”); 162 CONG. REC. H2, 32 (daily ed. 
Apr. 27, 2016) (statement of Rep. Jeffries) (“But because of the increasing nature of the problem and the fact that 
it is both multistate and multinational in nature, the State law domain has become inadequate . . .”); 162 CONG. 
REC. S16, 30 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 2016) (statement of Sen. Coon) (“Not only does trade secret theft cost American 
businesses revenue, which puts American jobs at risk, but it also discourages businesses from investing in critical 
research and development . . .”).  
 36.  Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376. 
 37.  Id.  
 38.  These remedies are: (1) an injunction, (2) a reasonable royalty (in exceptional circumstances), (3) 
damages for actual loss and unjust enrichment, and (4) exemplary damages (if the trade secret was willfully and 
maliciously misappropriated). Id. at 379–80.  
 39.  UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT WITH 1985 AMENDMENTS, 4–5 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N, 1979) (amended 1985). 
Only New York, Massachusetts, and North Carolina have not adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. CRS 
REPORT, supra note 1, at 6 n.37.   
 40.  Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 381. See infra Part IV for a detailed 
discussion on how these terms play a critical role in subduing the Trade Secret Troll.  
 41.  Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 382–83. 
 42.  This agent can be a federal, state, or local official. Id.  
 43.  Id. at 383–85.  
 44.  Id. at 385. 
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DTSA is also Congress’ response to the weakness of the EEA.45 While the EEA does 
provide substantial criminal fines and imprisonment penalties when there is either 
economic espionage or theft of a trade secret, it has not proved to be as effective as 
Congress hoped.46 Since its enactment, there have only been 125 indictments and ten 
convictions.47 Moreover, the EEA rarely compensates the victim; rather, it only 
punishes the felon.48 DTSA fills these gaps by creating a civil cause of action, assuring 
more actions for trade secret misappropriation will be brought and victims will be 
compensated.49  
C.  Key Provision of the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016: Ex Parte Seizure  
DTSA permits a federal judge to grant an ex parte seizure of a trade secret under 
“extraordinary circumstances.”50 The Supreme Court has interpreted the term 
“extraordinary” to require litigants to meet a high threshold: the circumstances must 
be “truly unusual.”51 To find such circumstances, a judge must, based on the facts of 
the case, conclude that:52 (1) the applicant is likely to succeed in showing that the 
 
 45.  See 162 CONG. REC. S16, 27 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 2016) (Statement of Sen. Hatch) (“Currently, the only 
Federal vehicle for trade secret protection is the 1996 Economic Espionage Act, which makes trade secret theft by 
foreign nationals a criminal offense. But this remedy criminalizes a small subset of trade secret theft and relies on 
the thinly stretched resources of the Department of Justice to investigate and prosecute such offenses.”); 162 
CONG. REC. H2, 32 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 2016) (statement of Rep. Collins) (“However, this [the EEA] addresses part 
of the problem, and criminalizes only a portion of trade secrets theft, whereas a civil remedy for misuse and 
misappropriation would allow companies to more broadly protect their property.”); 162 CONG. REC. H2, 33 (daily 
ed. Apr. 27, 2016) (statement of Rep. Nadler) (“While the Federal Government may bring criminal prosecutions 
and may move for civil injunctions, this power is rarely exercised and often fails to adequately compensate 
victims.”). 
 46.  Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. §1831(a)(5), §1832(b), (2012); See 142, CONG. REC. H10, 
461 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1996) (Statement of Rep. Hyde) (“I support this bill [the EEA] because it will enact a 
comprehensive statute to combat this crime [trade secret theft].”); 142 CONG. REC. S12, 211 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 
1996) (Statement of Sen. Kohl) (“Mr. President, this legislation [the EEA] is crucial.”); 142 CONG. REC. S12, 214 
(daily ed. Oct. 2, 1996) (Statement of Sen. Hatch) (“I am confident that all my colleagues will agree that H.R. 
3723 [what would become the EEA], a bill which we have crafted and has undergone minor House modification, 
is a strong and meaningful deterrent to criminals considering engaging in economic espionage.”). 
 47.  CRS Report, supra note 1, at 18.  
 48.  Id.  
 49.  See Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376. 
 50.  Id.  
 51.  Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 (1972). The lower courts have also attempted to define extraordinary 
circumstances. See Cmty. Dental Servs. v. Tani, 282 F.3d 1164, 1168 (9th Cir. 2002) (Defining extraordinary 
circumstances in the context of setting aside a default judgment); Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White 536 F.3d 244, 255 
(3d Cir. 2008) (“We have explained that a showing of extraordinary circumstances involves a showing that 
without relief from the judgment, ‘an “extreme” and “unexpected” hardship will result.’”); see generally Harper 
v. Ercole 648 F.3d 132, 137 (2d Cir. 2011) (“The term ‘extraordinary’ refers not to the uniqueness of a party’s 
circumstances, but rather to the severity of the obstacle impeding compliance with a limitations period.”). 
 52.   For purposes of brevity, the Author has selected the most pertinent conclusions a judge must make 
before issuing an order for an ex parte seizure above-the-line.  The other conclusions which a judge must make 
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information is a trade secret, (2) the person whom the seizure is being ordered against 
has either misappropriated the trade secret of the applicant by improper means or 
conspired to do so, (3) the application describes with “reasonable particularity” the 
property to be seized and where the property is located, (4) the applicant will suffer 
“immediate and irreparable injury” if the seizure is not ordered, and (5) the applicant 
has not publicized the requested seizure.53  
Assuming the applicant convinces the judge that an ex parte seizure is necessary, 
DTSA requires that the court order “provide for the narrowest seizure of property 
necessary. . .”54 In other words, vast swaths of property cannot be seized.55 When the 
court does seize the trade secret, it does not mean that it becomes public.56 The court 
must have a hearing within seven days of the seizure where the applicant has the 
burden of proof in “supporting the findings of fact and conclusions of law necessary 
to support the order.”57 If the applicant fails to meet this burden, the seizure order is 
either dissolved or modified.58 Also, a person who suffers from the wrongful seizure 
can assert an action for damages under section 34(d)(11) of the Trademark Act of 
1946.59 
II.  THE PATENT TROLL AND A DEFENSE OF THE TRADE SECRET TROLL  
A.  The Patent Troll 
In the realm of patent law, the Patent Troll60 is the harbinger of litigation and 
intimidation.61 It is an individual or entity that acquires ownership of a patent 
 
are: (1) an injunction or another form of equitable relief would not suffice, (2) the harm of denying the 
application outweighs the harm of the person subject to the seizure, (3) the person against whom the seizure 
would be ordered has actual possession of the trade secret and any property that is to be seized, and (4) the person 
against whom the seizure is ordered would make the trade secret inaccessible to the court. Defend Trade Secrets 
Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376–77. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 377. 
 55.  See id.; Cf. Troll, supra note 9, at 255 (“Instead, seizure would extend to wide swaths of information that 
need not include actual trade secrets.”). 
 56.  Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 378. 
 57.  Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 379. 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(11) (2012); Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-
153, 130 Stat. 379. 
 60.  The term “Patent Troll” was coined by Peter Detkin (then assistant general counsel for Intel 
Corporation) who argued that “a patent troll is somebody who tries to make a lot of money off a patent that they 
are not practicing and have no intention of practicing and in most cases never practiced.” Anna Mayergoyz, 
Lessons from Europe on How to Tame U.S. Patent Trolls, 42 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 242, 245 (2009).  
 61.  See WILLIAM J. WATKINS, JR., PATENT TROLLS PREDATORY LITIGATION AND THE SMOTHERING OF 
INNOVATION 11 (2013).  
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without the intention of actually using it to produce a product.62 Instead, when the 
troll discovers that its patent is being infringed upon, it will either demand that the 
infringer pay for the use of the patent (a license) or drag the infringer into court.63 
Patent Trolls have played a key role in the dramatic increase in patent lawsuits, 
forcing businesses to spend more money on patent litigation than on research and 
development.64 According to the Executive Office of the President and the 
Congressional Research Service, Patent Trolls’ litigation cost businesses “$29 billion 
per year in direct out-of-pocket costs, with an aggregate destruction of over sixty 
billion dollars per year.”65 It is clear that Patent Trolls are only focused on profit at 
the cost of innovation.66 The question, therefore, is how Patent Trolls take advantage 
of the law to exact their tribute.  
The Patent Troll is enabled by the strict liability standard of § 271(a) of The Patent 
Act of 1952.67 The provision states that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this title, 
whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, 
within the United States or imports into the United States any patented invention 
during the term of the patent therefore, infringes the patent.”68 Courts have 
interpreted this provision to mean infringement of a patent is a strict liability 
offense.69 Thus, unintentional or inadvertent infringement is not a defense to a patent 
infringement claim.70 The infringer becomes liable for all economic injuries that the 
 
 62.  Id.  
 63.  Id. at 13.  
 64.  Id. at 15.  
 65.  Sean D. Harding, Meet the Patents: Fostering Innovation and Reducing Costs by Opening Patent Portfolios, 
11 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 199, 206 (2016). 
 66.  Id. at 208. For an interesting discussion of why Patent Trolls benefit society and are part of the natural 
evolution of the patent market see generally James F. McDonough III, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An Alternative 
View of the Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY L.J. 189 (2006). 
 67.  See 35 U.S.C. §271(a) (2012).  
 68.  Id.  
 69.  Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1570 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (citing Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-
Jenkinson Co. 62 F.3d 1512, 1527 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), rev’d on other grounds, 520 U.S. 17 (1997)); In re 
Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007), abrogated on other grounds by, 136 S.Ct. 1923 (2016); 
Paone v. Microsoft Corp., 881 F. Supp. 2d 386, 394 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).  
 70.  Freedman v. Friedman, 242 F.2d 364, 366 (4th Cir. 1957) (“We think it is clear, also, that knowledge by 
an infringer or a contributory infringer of the existence of a patent and that he is infringing is not necessary to 
render him liable for infringement.”); Thurber Corp. v. Fairchild Motor Corp., 269 F.2d 841, 845 (5th Cir. 1959) 
(“Of course it is true that determination of the validity and infringement of a patent can be made irrespective of 
the purpose and intent of the alleged infringer, and that is not necessary that he even have knowledge of the patent 
alleged to be infringed.”); In re Omeprazole Patent Litig., 490 F. Supp. 2d 381, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“Intent is not 
an element of direct infringement, and neither ignorance nor good faith belief in non-infringement is a defense 
to a charge of direct infringement.”); Blair v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 291 F. Supp. 664, 670 (D.D.C. 1968) (“It 
is, of course, elementary, that an infringement may be entirely inadvertent and unintentional and without 
knowledge of the patent.”). 
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infringement has caused even if there was no intent to infringe.71 Strict liability clearly 
favors the Patent Troll because it need not prove intentional infringement, just that 
it happened.72 Whether regrettable or not, Patent Trolls have been sufficiently 
successful in courts so that this otherwise unproductive but profitable business 
continues.73 When the troll wins, the court is likely to grant him attorney’s fees, 
damages if there was willful infringement,74 and a permanent injunction75 prohibiting 
the victim from further manufacture, use, importation, or sale of the infringing item. 
Simply put, current patent law enables trolls to run amuck.76  
B.  The Trade Secret Troll  
It is argued that DTSA will bring forth a new type of troll: the Trade Secret Troll.77 
Like the Patent Troll, the TST could coerce an unsuspecting entity to pay for its use 
of the TST’s trade secret which actually may not be a trade secret but valuable or 
embarrassing information the TST thinks the unsuspecting entity does not want 
made public.78 Although TSTs are not currently prevalent, DTSA could spur TSTs to 
form because DTSA fails to address the problem of prohibiting harmful acts toward 
businesses.79 In other words, DTSA does not punish an individual for engaging in 
torts such as cyber-espionage. Rather, it punishes an individual who engages in a tort 
and takes what the statute defines as a trade secret.80 Therefore, when an entity takes 
 
 71.  Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Strict Liability and its Alternatives in Patent Law, 17 BERKLEY TECH. 
L.J. 799, 821 (2002).  
 72.  See id.  
 73.  See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 113–14 (2011) (finding that Microsoft did infringe 
on a Patent Troll’s patent); See also NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1325–26 (Fed. Cir. 
2005) abrogated on other grounds by Avid Tech., Inc. v. Harmonic, Inc. 812 F.3d 1040 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding 
NTP’s Blackberry system infringed on a Patent Troll’s patents). Generally speaking, Patent Trolls prefer to stay 
out of court and demand tribute from the victim instead. Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the 
Forest for the Trolls, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2126 (2013) (“[A] growing number of trolls are interested in quick, 
low-value settlements for a variety of patents. These plaintiffs do not want to go to trial and are thus not 
particularly interested in the quality of their patents or whether they are infringed.”).  
 74.  Warsaw Orthopedic, Inc., v. NuVasive, Inc., 824 F.3d 1344, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Power Lift, Inc., v. 
Lang Tools, Inc., 774 F.2d 478, 481 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
 75.  See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (establishing a four-factor test for 
determining if a district court can grant a permanent injunction in a patent infringement case). 
 76.  See WATKINS, supra note 61, at 49 (“Right now, the trolls place a hefty tax on innovative activity . . .”). 
 77.  Troll, supra note 9, at 234. The Author recognizes that Troll predates the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 
2016. The Author also notes that Troll’s main criticisms were directed at the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2014, S. 
2267, 113th Cong. (2014) and the Trade Secret Protection Act of 2014, H.R. 5233, 113th Cong. (2014). Even so, 
the criticisms are still valid because for the most part, both 2014 bills were incorporated into the Defend Trade 
Secrets Act of 2016. See generally Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376. 
 78.  Troll, supra note 9, at 241.  
 79.  Id. at 232, 235. 
 80.  Id. at 235; See Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 1839 (2012) (explaining what is classified 
as a trade secret).  
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property through an improper act,81 and that property is not a trade secret, it is not 
trade secret misappropriation under DTSA.82  
DTSA, it is argued, will make the TST more powerful than the Patent Troll because 
DTSA gives the TST a powerful coercive weapon: the right to request an ex parte 
seizure.83 Preliminarily, the ex parte seizure will permit “vast swaths” of information 
to be collected even if that information is not associated with the trade secret.84 
Knowing this, the troll will first demand its intended target to pay tribute or else face 
a possible ex parte seizure.85 It would then fall to the intended target to decide whether 
it is worth taking the risk or not, given that such a seizure would likely disrupt 
business operations.86 Moreover, the TST is not likely to care about the potential 
success of acquiring the ex parte seizure order; so long as the ends (profit) justify the 
means (that being a form of lawful extortion), the troll will do whatever it takes.87  
III.  THE HARMLESS TRADE SECRET TROLL  
A.  Intent   
Unlike patent infringement, trade secret misappropriation under both DTSA and 
UTSA, as well as New York, Massachusetts, and North Carolina state law requires 
that the party accused of misappropriation has intended to misappropriate the trade 
secret.88 This difference can best be exhibited in three scenarios that demonstrate the 
significance of intent under DTSA.  
1.  Scenario One: Strict Liability  
Company A is a small corporation in the business of making ice cream. Unlike other 
ice cream makers, Company A has created a special type of ice cream that hardens 
into a gummy like substance and becomes chewable when it comes into contact with 
 
 81.  See Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 381 (explaining what is classified 
as an improper act).  
 82.  Troll, supra note 9, at 235. 
 83.  Id. at 255; Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376. 
 84.  Troll, supra note 9, at 255.   
 85.  Id. at 255, 257.  
 86.  Id. at 255.  
 87.  Id. at 257.  
 88.  See Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 381; UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT 
WITH 1985 AMENDMENTS, 4 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N, 1979) (amended 1985). See also Integrated Cash Mgmt. Servs., 
Inc. v. Dig. Transactions, Inc., 920 F.2d 171, 173 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that in New York, a plaintiff asserting 
misappropriation of a trade secret has to prove the trade secret was acquired by a breach of duty or discovery by 
improper means – both of which are intent based). See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93 § 42 (West 2002) (illustrating 
the elements – all of which are intent based – that Massachusetts defines as misappropriation). See N.C. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 66-152 (West 2003) (explaining how North Carolina defines misappropriation as use of a trade 
secret without express or implied consent, which is also intent based).  
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saliva and tooth enamel. Company A decided not to file for a patent, believing that it 
was not worth the time and money. A few months into production, gummy ice cream 
became a world-wide phenomenon, making Company A very profitable.    
Company B (a Patent Troll) is a business entity whose sole purpose is to threaten 
unsuspecting companies with litigation for patent infringement. As it happens, prior 
to Company A’s invention of gummy ice cream, Company B had a utility patent89 on 
any food product that transforms from a liquid substance into a gummy and 
chewable one. Company B decides rather than demand Company A to stop making 
the gummy ice cream, it would “request” Company A to pay a licensing fee of a 
hundred million dollars and a royalty of ten dollars per unit of ice cream sold. If 
Company A refused the terms, Company B would threaten with litigation. In this 
case, Company B would likely succeed because patent infringement is not intent 
based. As already noted, it is a strict liability offense.90 The fact that Company A did 
not know that Company B had a utility patent that covered the creation process of 
gummy ice cream is irrelevant.  
2.  Scenario Two: No Intent to Misappropriate  
Assume the same facts as outlined in Scenario 1 except: (1) Company B is in the 
business of threatening trade secret litigation against unsuspecting companies (i.e. a 
Trade Secret Troll), (2) Company B does not have a utility patent, (3) Company A 
did not invent the gummy ice cream, instead, it was invented by John Doe, (4) John 
Doe sold the recipe to make gummy ice cream to Company A, and (5) Company B 
owned the rights to the recipe and did not consent to John Doe’s sale. In this scenario, 
Company B would not succeed in a claim for trade secret misappropriation because 
for a trade secret to be misappropriated under DTSA, Company A must have 
intended to misappropriate Company B’s trade secret by improper means.91 DTSA 
classifies improper means as “theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or 
inducement of a breach of duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage through electronic 
or other means.”92 Each of these means are intent based.93 Therefore, Company A’s 
 
 89.  A utility patent is granted for an invention that is a “process, machine, manufacture, or composition of 
matter.”  Utility Patent, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  
 90.  See supra Part II(A).  
 91.  See Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376.  
 92.  Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 381. 
 93.  See U.S. v. Hanjuan Jin, 733 F.3d 718, 721–22 (7th Cir. 2013) (finding that defendant misappropriated 
plaintiff’s trade secrets by stealing thousands of documents with the intent to harm plaintiff); U.S. v. Alfisi, 308 
F.3d 144, 149 (2d Cir. 2002) (“The ‘corrupt’ intent necessary to a bribery conviction is in the nature of a quid pro 
quo requirement; that is, there must be a ‘specific intent to give … something of value in exchange for an official 
act.’”) (internal citations omitted); U.S. v. Jennings, 160 F.3d 1006, 1013 (4th Cir. 1998) (“A bribe requires that 
the payment be made or promised ‘corruptly,’ that is, with ‘corrupt intent.’”); U.S. v. Agrawal, 726 F.3d 235, 244 
(2d Cir. 2013) (explaining that electronic espionage requires intent); Radiator Express v. Shie, 708 F. Supp. 2d 
762, 771 (E.D. Wis. 2010) (defining intent to deceive a plaintiff as an element of intentional misrepresentation 
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lack of intent to misappropriate Company B’s trade secret would protect it from 
liability.94  
3.  Scenario Three: A DTSA Violation  
Assume the same facts from Scenario 1 and 2 except: (1) Company B is Company A’s 
competitor (not a TST), and (2) Company A stole Company B’s recipe for gummy 
ice cream by bribing John Doe, an agent of Company B. This is a DTSA violation 
because Company A intended to misappropriate Company B’s trade secret (the 
gummy ice cream recipe) by improper means (bribery).95  
B.  The Troll’s “Trade Secret”  
As a general matter, a trade secret troll needs to be familiar with the nuances of the 
law affecting the subject of its trolling. That being said, it is highly unlikely that DTSA 
will increase the likelihood that trade secret misappropriation claims will be brought 
by a TST (or a “genuine” claimant) believing it has a trade secret if in fact the subject 
matter does not qualify as a trade secret.96 Cases of this nature are not novel and have 
been litigated in the courts frequently.97 Perhaps DTSA will spur more trade secret 
cases to be settled now that a plaintiff can forum shop between state and federal 
courts.98 Even so, this does not eliminate the requirement that plaintiffs (including 
TSTs, of course) must have a trade secret as defined by DTSA.99 The assertion, 
therefore, that TSTs will use DTSA “too aggressively”100 under the false pretense of 
owning a trade secret is without merit because it will not be so simple to prove a 
 
under Wisconsin law); Tel. Mgmt. Corp. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 32 F. Supp. 2d 960, 973 (N.D. Ohio 
1998) (defining intent to mislead another as an element of intentional misrepresentation under Ohio law). See 
generally First Fin. Bank, N.A. v. Bauknecht, 71 F. Supp. 3d 819 (C.D. Ill. 2014) (explaining how breach of 
fiduciary duty is intent based).  
 94.  The only way which Company A has trade secret liability is if it has reason to know that John Doe didn’t 
really own the rights to the recipe and was selling it without permission from Company B. See generally Defend 
Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376. 
 95.  See Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 381.  
 96.  Cf. Troll, supra note 9, at 241.  
 97.  See Strategic Directions Grp., Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 293 F.3d 1062, 1064–65 (8th Cir. 2002); 
R.C. Olmstead, Inc. v. CU Interface, LLC, 606 F.3d 262, 276 (6th Cir. 2010); Guy Carpenter & Co., Inc. v. 
Provenzale, 334 F.3d 459, 468 (5th Cir. 2003).  
 98.  See Ned Himmelrich, Federal Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016: Action item, Added Ammunition and 
Comparison to Maryland’s Statute, MD. BAR ASS’N INTELL. PROP. SEC. BULL., June 2016, at 2 (“Litigators now 
should include in their forum-shopping calculus the fact that their local federal court is now available when 
previously a trade secret dispute might otherwise have necessitated a state court action.”).  
 99.  DTSA incorporates the EEA’s definition of what constitutes a trade secret. See Economic Espionage Act 
of 1996, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1839 (2012). 
 100.  Troll, supra note 9, at 241 (“Thus, it portends the creation of the ‘trade secret troll’ because there is a 
significant risk that a new federal civil cause of action for trade secret misappropriation will be used too aggressively 
by those who think they own trade secrets . . .”) (emphasis added).   
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prima facie case for trade secret misappropriation under DTSA.101 For example, the 
TST may well be stymied by the challenges of proving what constitutes a trade secret, 
and whether it was even misappropriated.102 If the TST were to go ahead and assert 
trade secret misappropriation when there is uncertainty whether a trade secret 
exists,103 as will be discussed below, the TST could be subject to potential sanctions by 
the court.104 In a sense, it appears that DTSA requires greater scrutiny and preparation 
of trolls than the Patent Act.105 
C.  The Troll’s Presumed Weapon: Ex Parte Seizure 
The TST’s request for an ex parte seizure of its intended target’s trade secret is unlikely 
to be granted because of DTSA’s stringent requirements.106 DTSA states that “the 
court may, upon ex parte application but only in extraordinary circumstances, issue 
an order providing for the seizure of property necessary to prevent the propagation 
or dissemination of the trade secret that is subject of the action.”107 As previously 
mentioned, the Supreme Court has classified “extraordinary” as “truly unusual.”108 
The TST, then, has the burden of proving how its situation is extraordinary and how 
an injunction or another form of equitable remedy would not suffice.109 If the troll 
were to pass this test, DTSA has additional burdens that would likely deter the troll 
from proceeding any further with a request:110 (1) proof of immediate and irreparable 
 
 101.  R. Mark Halligan, Revisited 2015: Protection of U.S. Trade Secret Assets: Critical Amendments to the 
Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 14 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 476, 487 (2015).  
 102.  This is unlike patent infringement where simply attaching a publicly issued patent as an exhibit to a 
federal complaint meets the burden of proving possible infringement. Id.  
 103.  The assumption here is that the TST is not “reasonably” certain that it owns a trade secret and therefore 
is making a specious claim. See infra Part IV. 
 104.  See infra Part IV.  
 105.  Compare Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 379–80, with 35 U.S.C. 
§271(a) (2012).  
 106.  See James Pooley, The Myth of the Trade Secret Troll: Why Defend Trade Secrets Act Improves the 
Protection of Commercial Information, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1045, 1071 (2016) (“The DTSA requirements for 
trade secret seizure are significantly more stringent than those in the Lanham Act.”). Cf. Troll, supra note 9, at 
252-253. 
 107.  Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376. 
 108.  Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 (1972).  
 109.  Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376–77. 
 110.  While there are other requirements for a court to consider before granting an ex parte seizure, the two 
listed above are quintessential because Congress intended those to be threshold requirements. See H.R. REP. NO. 
114-529, at 5 (2016); 162 CONG. REC. S16, 627 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 2016) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“To ensure that 
companies do not use the seizure authority for anti-competitive purposes, this legislation requires those seeking 
redress to make a rigorous showing that they own the trade secret, that the trade secret was stolen, and that their 
parties would not be harmed if an ex parte order were granted.”). However, an ex parte seizure must be carried 
out without any notice to the intended target. Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 
377 (“[T]he applicant has not publicized the requested seizure.”). If the TST attempts to coerce the intended 
target with a threat of an ex parte seizure, it would likely defeat the TST’s ability to get a seizure order, and it might 
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injury, and (2) the danger of instigating a wrongful seizure action against the 
applicant (the troll).111   
1.  Immediate and Irreparable Injury  
The TST will likely be unable to prove that it will suffer an immediate and irreparable 
injury because, as with the Patent Troll, the TST will hide its trade secrets until they 
are misappropriated or, in the alternative, the TST will fail to demonstrate why a legal 
or equitable solution does not suffice.112 DTSA specifically requires that the district 
court find that “an immediate and irreparable injury will occur if such seizure is not 
ordered.”113 The courts have understood the term “immediate” to mean 
“imminent.”114 In the context of the Lanham Act,115 courts have interpreted 
irreparable injury to mean a “potential harm which cannot be redressed by a legal or 
an equitable remedy following a trial.”116 The harm must “be of a peculiar nature, so 
that compensation in money cannot atone for it.”117 In this regard, courts have 
established that a risk of irreparable harm is not enough to demonstrate actual 
irreparable harm.118 
Like the Patent Troll, whose sole purpose is to hoard patents until they are 
infringed upon, the TST is likely to hoard trade secrets without ever making use of 
them until they are misappropriated.119 If this hoarding without use takes place, the 
troll has suffered no immediate harm because the troll has not utilized his trade secret 
 
also give the intended target the ability to file a declaratory judgment action asking a court (of the intended target’s 
choosing) to declare that there is no trade secret and/or no misappropriation.  
 111.  Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376, 379. 
 112.  See infra notes 119–21 and accompanying text. 
 113.  Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376. 
 114.  Direx Isr., Ltd. v. Breakthrough Med. Corp., 952 F.2d 802, 812 (4th Cir. 1991); In re Microsoft Corp. 
Antitrust Litig. 333 F.3d 517, 528–29 (4th Cir. 2003), abrogated on other grounds by Pashby v. Delia, 709 F.3d 307 
(4th Cir. 2013).  
 115.  A comparison to the Lanham Act is acceptable because the both the Lanham Act’s and DTSA’s ex parte 
seizure provisions share similar (and in some instances, identical) language and a common raison d’etre. See 
Northcross v. Bd. of Educ. of Memphis City Schs. 412 U.S. 427, 428 (1973).  As such, it is appropriate to interpret 
the ex parte seizure of each statute pari passu. See id.  
 116.  Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797, 801 (3d Cir. 1989). See also Sampson v. 
Murray 415 U.S. 61, 94 (1974) (“The key word in this consideration is irreparable. Mere injuries, however 
substantial, in terms of money, time and energy necessarily expended in the absence of a stay are not enough. The 
possibility that adequate compensatory or other corrective relief will be available at a later date, in the ordinary 
course of litigation, weighs heavily against a claim of irreparable harm.”) (internal citations omitted).  
 117.  ECRI v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 809 F.2d 223, 226 (3d Cir. 1987) (citing Glasco v. Hills, 558 F.2d 179, 181 
(3d Cir. 1977)).  
 118.  Id.; Tucker Anthony Realty Corp. v. Schlesinger, 888 F.2d 969, 975 (2d Cir. 1989).  
 119.   See WATKINS, supra note 61, at 13. 
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to any effect.120 Assuming, however, that the troll has made use of the trade secret in 
some capacity to increase its value as an entity, it would still be highly unlikely that it 
could prove an irreparable injury because unless the harm was “peculiar in function,” 
monetary compensation (a legal remedy) or an injunction (an equitable remedy) can 
likely repair the damage caused by the misappropriation.121  
2.  Cause of Action for Wrongful Seizure  
The TST will likely be deterred from requesting an ex parte seizure out of fear that 
the unsuspecting entity will retaliate with a wrongful seizure action.122 In the context 
of the Lanham Act,123 the courts have understood wrongful seizures to occur when: 
(1) an ex parte seizure has taken place, (2) the victim was damaged by the seizure, and 
(3) either the seized goods were not infringing or the party seeking the seizure did so 
in bad faith.124 Assuming that the first two requirements are met, the question of 
greatest consequence is whether the troll requested the seizure in bad faith.125 While 
courts determine bad faith on a case-by-case basis and define it in numerous ways,126 
 
 120.  For a trade secret to have value, it must be used by an entity at some point and remain a secret. See UNIF. 
TRADE SECRETS ACT WITH 1985 AMENDMENTS, 5 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N, 1979) (amended 1985). In New York and 
Massachusetts (which have not adopted UTSA) this argument is even stronger considering that for something to 
be considered a trade secret, it must be continuously used in the operation of business. J.T. Healy & Son, Inc. v. 
James A. Murphy & Son, Inc., 260 N.E. 2d 723, 729 (Mass. 1970); Ashland Mgmt. v. Janien, 624 N.E. 2d 1007, 
1013 (N.Y. 1993).  
 121.  Peculiar in function should not be construed as a trade secret losing its secrecy because in the context of 
trade secret misappropriation, this allegation is asserted frequently. See Lejune v. Coin Acceptors 849 A.2d 451, 
464 (Md. 2004) (finding that plaintiff’s pricing and cost information were trade secrets because plaintiff took 
steps to maintain its secrecy); Penalty Kick Mgmt. Ltd. v. Coca-Cola Co., 318 F.3d 1284, 1291–92 (11th Cir. 2003) 
(finding that plaintiff did not disclose a trade secret to the public because it was a unique combination of 
information); Trandes Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 996 F.2d 655, 664 (4th Cir. 1993) (finding that plaintiff did 
possess a trade secret because absolute secrecy is not required).  
 122.  See Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 379. 
 123.  DTSA specifically provides that an entity who has suffered from a wrongful seizure is entitled to “the 
same relief as is provided under section 34(d)(11) of the Trademark Act of 1946.” Defend Trade Secrets Act of 
2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 379; See The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 116(d)(11) (2012). 
 124.  Prince of Peace Enters., Inc. v. Top Quality Food Mkt., LLC, 760 F. Supp. 2d 384, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
See Waco Int’l, Inc. v. KHK Scaffolding Hous., Inc., 278 F.3d 523, 530 (5th Cir. 2002) (“Congress did identify, 
however, several guidelines for determining whether a seizure was wrongful. Congress indicated that a seizure 
may be wrongful: (1) where an applicant acted in ‘bad faith’ in seeking the order; or (2) if the goods seized are 
predominately legitimate merchandise, even if the plaintiff acted in good faith.”). 
 125.  Trade secrets cannot be infringed upon because they are not registered with the federal government. The 
infringement prong of the Lanham Act’s wrongful seizure test is aimed at goods which are counterfeits and 
therefore infringe on a trademark. See, e.g., Vuitton v. White, 945 F.2d 569, 570 (3d Cir. 1991); Pepe (U.K.) Ltd. 
v. Ocean View Factory Outlet Corp., 770 F. Supp. 754, 756–57 (D.P.R. 1991). 
 126.  Zenith Electronics Corp. v. Exzec, Inc., 182 F.3d 1340, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“Exactly what constitutes 
bad faith remains to be determined on a case by case basis.”). 
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a general definition of what constitutes bad faith is “dishonesty in belief, purpose, or 
motive.”127  For the TST, all three forms of dishonesty are applicable.  
One of the primary purposes behind the ex parte seizure is to prevent the party 
subject to the seizure from “propagation or dissemination of the trade secret that is 
subject of the action.”128 By making the request for an ex parte seizure, the troll 
believes that the unsuspecting entity will proceed with this form of action.129 
However, as advocates of the TST rightfully point out, the unsuspecting entity has no 
interest in making the trade secret public knowledge because that would hurt the 
entity’s business interests.130 Put differently, the unsuspecting entity relies on the trade 
secret’s secrecy to be profitable; whether or not it realizes that the trade secret belongs 
to the TST is irrelevant to that purpose. This, combined with the unsuspecting 
entity’s lack of intent to misappropriate, will make requesting an ex parte seizure in 
many or most instances difficult and unreasonable.131 It is likely the TST would be 
aware of these facts and, therefore, requesting an ex parte seizure would be dishonest 
in belief. 
A TST’s dishonest purpose and motive in requesting the ex parte seizure would 
presumably seek to stifle innovation for monetary gain.132 Like the Patent Troll, the 
TST’s primary goal is to punish those who do not pay for the “wrongful” taking of 
the troll’s property.133 In addition, the purpose of the seizure request seemingly would 
be to disrupt the business operations of the unsuspecting entity, whether or not that 
entity may be a competitor of the troll in some capacity.134 As a general matter, 
however, the troll would likely expect denial of its ex parte seizure request, yet would 
 
 127.  Bad faith, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  
 128.  Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376. 
 129.  See id. 
 130.  Troll, supra note 9, at 254.  
 131.  See supra Part III(A). 
 132.  For purposes of this Comment, the Author has combined purpose and motive because they are one in 
the same with respect to how the trade secret troll will use an ex parte seizure to his advantage. The Author also 
recognizes that this is questionable in as much as there is nothing wrong with ensuring that one’s property is 
protected from harm. However, given that the requisite intent to harm is not evident combined with the trade 
secret troll’s sole purpose in establishing itself as an entity is to initiate law suits against supposedly infringing 
entities, there is a strong policy argument that can be made which the troll’s purpose for existing is dishonest. See 
supra Part III(A), Part II(B).  
 133.  See WATKINS, supra note 61, at 17 (“patents are being held by non-operating companies [Patent Trolls] 
in hopes that someone will invent something that they can sue over.”) (citing Gregory Ferenstein, Mark Cuban’s 
Awesome Justification for Endowing a Chair to “Eliminate Stupid Patents,” Jan. 31, 2013, 
https://techcrunch.com/2013/01/31/mark-cubans-awesome-justification-for-endowing-a-chair-for-eliminating 
-stupid-patents/). 
 134.  See Troll, supra note 9, at 257. In the context of patent trolling, this is very frequent. James Bessen, et al., 
The Private and Social Costs of Patent Trolls, REG. (Winter 2011-2012), at 26 (“To the extent that this litigation 
represents an unavoidable business cost to technology developers, it reduces the profits that these firms make on 
their technology investments. That is, these lawsuits reduce their incentives to innovate.”). 
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pursue it because the troll “operate[s] based upon unsubstantiated threats of 
litigation, rather than a concern about losing in courts.”135 In rough form, in a typical 
trolling dispute, what you have is an unbalanced conflict between a troll concerned 
with litigation and a target protecting its business. 
IV.  HOW TO CROSS THE BRIDGE SAFELY 
TSTs exist and even flourish to the extent that frivolous or unmeritorious litigation 
can be profitably initiated. In the United States, there is an open marketplace for 
litigation of nearly every sort and against nearly anyone.136 If this right is exercised in 
a frivolous manner, a court can dismiss the lawsuit, impose sanctions, or both.137 In 
the context of trade secrecy law, frivolous claims for trade secret misappropriation 
are brought frequently.138 If a TST brings an unsuspecting entity into court, the entity 
should assert that the TST brought the claim of misappropriation in bad faith.139 
Those, however, are only allegations– on both sides– and they come with a price (not 
the least of which being attorney’s fees). 
A.  Misappropriation in Bad Faith  
DTSA provides that “if a claim of the misappropriation is made in bad faith, which 
may be established by circumstantial evidence, . . . award reasonable attorney’s fees 
to the prevailing party.”140 Modeled on § 4 of UTSA, this provision should be 
understood in light of the UTSA drafters’ belief that awarding attorney fees are meant 
 
 135.  Troll, supra note 9, at 257.  
 136.  Chambers v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907) (“The right to sue and defend in the courts 
is the alternative of force. In an organized society it is the right conservative of all other rights, and lies at the 
foundation of orderly government. It is one of the highest and most essential privileges of citizenship, and must 
be allowed by each state to the citizens of all other states to the precise extent that it is allowed to its own citizens. 
Equality of treatment in this respect is not left to depend upon comity between the states, but is granted and 
protected by the Federal Constitution.”) (internal citations omitted).  
 137.  The Constitution of the United States creates a federalist system of government in which a national 
government and multiple state governments coexist. See M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 317 (1819) (“The 
states have no power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control the operations 
of the constitutional laws enacted by congress to carry into effect the powers vested in the national government.”) 
As such, there exist both federal and state courts which have different sets of rules for handling frivolous lawsuits. 
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 for how federal courts handle frivolous claims. Because each state has its own rules of court 
procedure, for purposes of brevity, the Author will not list them but encourages the reader to look up his/her 
local court’s rules on the matter.  
 138.  Homecare CRM, LLC v. Adam Grp., Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 1373, 1380 (N.D. Ga. 2013); Quantlab Techs. 
Ltd. v. Godlevsky 719 F. Supp. 2d 766, 780-81 (S.D. Tex. 2010); Fleming Sales Co. v. Bailey 611 F. Supp. 507, 518-
20 (N.D. Ill. 1985).  
 139.  Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 380.  
 140.  Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 380. 
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“in specified circumstances as a deterrent to specious claims of misappropriation .”141 
Although the courts have interpreted bad faith in numerous ways, when deciding 
whether to award attorney fees in trade secret misappropriation cases, the Federal 
District Courts have widely adopted a two-prong test based on the UTSA drafters’ 
commentary, requiring: (1) objective speciousness of the claim, and (2) subjective 
misconduct by the plaintiff in making the claim.142 
1.  Objective Speciousness  
A TST’s allegation that an unsuspecting entity misappropriated its trade secret is 
likely to be held objectively specious. Objective speciousness is present when “the 
action superficially appears to have merit but there is a complete lack of evidence to 
support the claim.”143 While the unsuspecting entity may have taken the TST’s trade 
secret without the TST’s consent, without the requisite intent it is impossible to 
misappropriate a trade secret under DTSA.144 
2.  Subjective Misconduct  
Subjective misconduct is present when “a plaintiff knows or is reckless in not 
knowing that its claim for trade secret misappropriation has no merit.”145 A prevailing 
defendant can rely on the direct evidence of the plaintiff’s knowledge or in the 
absence of direct proof, whether the plaintiff made the claim for an improper 
purpose.146 A claim for improper purpose is “to harass the opposing party.”147 As 
critics of DTSA point out with their “apocalyptic speculation,”148 the TST will “roam 
free in a confused and unsettled environment, threatening or initiating law suits for 
the sole purpose of exacting settlement payments, just like existing patent trolls.”149 
This type of harassment, where the troll is interested in harming its intended target 
 
 141.  UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT WITH 1985 AMENDMENTS, 11–12 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N, 1979) (amended 
1985). See also H.R. REP. NO. 114-529, at 13 (2016). 
 142.  Contract Materials Processing, Inc. v. Kataleuna GMBH Catalysts, 222 F. Supp. 2d 733, 744 (D. Md. 
2002); Degussa Admixtures, Inc. v. Burnett, 471 F. Supp. 2d 848, 857 (W.D. Mich. 2007). 
 143.  FLIR Sys., Inc. v. Parrish, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 307, 313 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009).  
 144.  See supra Part III(A). 
 145.  Krafft v. Downey, 68 A.3d 329, 336 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013) (citing Hill v. Best Medical International, Inc., 
Nos. 07-1709, 08-1404, 09-1194, 2011 WL 6749036, at *1, *4 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 2011)). 
 146.  Id. (citing Contract Materials Processing, Inc. v. Kataleuna GMBH Catalysts, 222 F. Supp. 2d 733, 744 
(D. Md. 2002)). 
 147.  Id. at 336–37 (citing Gemini Aluminum Corp. v. California Custom Shapes, Inc., 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358, 
369 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002)). 
 148.  Pooley, supra note 106, at 1078 (2016). 
 149.  Troll, supra note 9, at 252.  
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for its own monetary gain, would likely be punished by the courts as subjective 
misconduct.150  
CONCLUSION 
DTSA does not welcome or herald the arrival of TSTs.151 The fear that it will is 
premised on a misunderstanding, or lack of appreciation, of the difference between 
trade secret misappropriation and patent infringement; and is further exacerbated by 
discounting satisfaction of the very stringent requirements needed to obtain an ex 
parte seizure.152 Contrary to patent infringement, where strict liability is in force, trade 
secret misappropriation is a purposeful  wrong requiring the accused to have an 
intent to misappropriate.153 This crucial difference is what makes patent trolling 
possible and trade secret trolling much more difficult and less likely to succeed.154 As 
contemplated, DTSA is crafted with precautions to circumscribe undesirable trolling 
activity, making such activity wasteful and ill-advised.155 Thus, while providing a 
seizure mechanism for enforcement, wrongful seizures and bad faith actions are 
subject to their own redress.156 Ultimately, litigation experience will determine 
whether the benefits of DTSA are real, and whether the trolling concerns are 
misplaced. The potential benefit for U.S. commerce is sufficient to justify the federal 















 150.  See Gemini Aluminum Corp., 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 369; FLIR Sys., Inc., 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 313. 
 151.  See Halligan, supra note 101, at 14; Pooley, supra note 106, at 1077–78 (2016). Cf. Troll, supra note 9, at 
234.  
 152.  See Troll, supra note 9, at 252.  
 153.  See supra Part III(A). 
 154.  See supra Part III, Part IV. 
 155.  See supra Part IV. 
 156.  See supra Part IV. 
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